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 Governments, military, corporations, financial institutions and others exchange a great deal of 
confidential information using Internet these days. Protecting such confidential information and ensuring 
their integrity and origin authenticity are of paramount importance. There exist protocols and solutions at 
different layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack to address these security requirements. Application level 
encryption viz. PGP for secure mail transfer, TLS based secure TCP communication, IPSec for providing 
IP layer security are among these security solutions. Due to scalability, wide acceptance of the IP 
protocol, and its application independent character, the IPSec protocol has become a standard for 
providing Internet security.  
 The IPSec provides two protocols namely the Authentication header (AH) and  the Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP). Each protocol can operate in two modes, viz. transport and tunnel mode. The 
AH provides data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and anti replay protection. The ESP 
provides all the security functionalities of AH along with confidentiality. The IPSec protocols provide 
end-to-end security for an entire IP datagram or the upper layer protocols of IP payload depending on the 
mode of operation.  
 However, this end-to-end model of security restricts performance enhancement and security 
related operations of intermediate networking and security devices, as they can not access or modify 
transport and upper layer headers and original IP headers in case of tunnel mode. These intermediate 
devices include routers providing Quality of Service (QoS), TCP Performance Enhancement Proxies 
(PEP), Application level Proxy devices and packet filtering firewalls. 
 The interoperability problem between IPSec and  intermediate devices has been addressed  in 
literature. Transport friendly ESP (TF-ESP), Transport Layer Security (TLS), splitting of single IPSec 
tunnel into multiple tunnels, Multi Layer IPSec (ML-IPSec) are a few of the proposed solutions. The ML-
IPSec protocol solves this interoperability problem without violating the end-to-end security for the data 
or exposing some important header fields unlike the other solutions. 
 The ML-IPSec uses a multilayer protection model in place of the single end-to-end model. Unlike 
IPSec where the scope of encryption and authentication applies to the entire IP datagram, this scheme 
divides the IP datagram into zones. It applies different protection schemes to different zones. When ML-
IPSec protects a traffic stream from its source to its destination, it first partitions the IP datagram into 
zones and applies zone-specific cryptographic protections. During the flow of the ML-IPSec protected 
datagram through an authorized intermediate gateway, certain type I zones of the datagram  may be 
decrypted and re-encrypted, but the other zones will remain untouched. When the datagram reaches its 
destination, the ML-IPSec will reconstruct the entire datagram. 
 The ML-IPSec protocol, however suffers from the problem of static configuration of zones and 
zone specific cryptographic parameters before the commencement of the communication. Static 
configuration requires a priori knowledge of routing infrastructure and manual configuration of all 
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intermediate nodes. While this may not be an issue in a geo-stationary satellite environment using TCP-
PEP, it could pose problems in a mobile or distributed environment, where many stations may be in 
concurrent use. The ML-IPSec endpoints may not be trusted by all intermediate nodes in a mobile 
environment for manual configuration without any prior arrangement providing the mutual trust. The 
static zone boundary of the protocol forces one to ignore the presence of TCP/IP datagrams with variable 
header lengths (in case of TCP or IP headers with OPTION fields). Thus ML-IPSec will not function 
correctly if the endpoints change the use of IP or TCP options, especially in case of tunnel mode. The 
zone mapping proposed in ML-IPSec is static in nature. This forces one to configure the zone mapping 
before the commencement of the communication. It restricts the protocol from dynamically changing the 
zone mapping for providing access to intermediate nodes without terminating the existing ML-IPSec 
communication. The ML-IPSec endpoints can off course, configure the zone mapping with maximum 
number of zones. This will lead to unnecessary overheads that increase with the number of zones. Again, 
static zone mapping could pose problems in a mobile or distributed environment, where communication 
paths may change. 
 Our extension to the ML-IPSec protocol, called Dynamic Multi Layer IPSec (DML-IPSec) 
proposes a multi layer variant with the capabilities of dynamic zone configuration and sharing of 
cryptographic parameters between IPSec endpoints and intermediate nodes. It also accommodates IP 
datagrams with variable length headers. The DML-IPSec protocol redefines some of the IPSec and ML-
IPSec fundamentals. It proposes significant modifications to the datagram processing stage of ML-IPSec 
and proposes a new key sharing protocol to provide the above-mentioned capabilities. 
  The DML-IPSec supports the AH and ESP protocols of the conventional IPSec with some 
modifications required for providing separate cryptographic protection to different zones of an IP 
datagram. This extended protocol defines zone as a set of non-overlapping and contiguous partitions of an 
IP datagram, unlike the case of ML-IPSec where a zone may consist of non-contiguous portions. Every 
zone is provided with cryptographic protection independent of other zones. The DML-IPSec categorizes 
zones into two separate types depending on the accessibility requirements at the intermediate nodes. The 
first type of zone, called type I zone, is defined on headers of IP datagram and is required for examination 
and modification by intermediate nodes. One type I zone may span over a single header or over a series of 
contiguous headers of an IP datagram. The second type of zone, called type II zone, is meant for the 
payload portion and is kept secure between endpoints of IPSec communications. The single type II zone 
starts immediately after the last type I zone and spans till the end of the IP datagram. If no intermediate 
processing is required during the entire IPSec session, the single type II zone may cover the whole IP 
datagram; otherwise the single type II zone follows one or more type I zones of the IP datagram. The 
DML-IPSec  protocol uses a  mapping from the octets of the IP datagram to different zones, called zone 
map for partitioning an IP datagram into zones.  The zone map contains logical boundaries for the zones, 
unlike physical byte specific boundaries of ML-IPSec. The physical boundaries are derived on-the-fly, 
using either the implicit header lengths or explicit header length fields of the protocol headers. This 
property of the DML-IPSec zones, enables it to accommodate datagrams with variable header lengths. 
Another important feature of DML-IPSec zone is that the zone maps need not  remain constant through 
out the entire lifespan of IPSec communication. The key sharing protocol may modify any existing zone 
map for providing service to some intermediate node.  
The DML-IPSec also redefines Security Association (SA), a relationship between two endpoints 
of IPSec communication that describes how the entities will use security services to communicate 
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securely. In the case of DML-IPSec, several intermediate nodes may participate in defining these security 
protections to the IP datagrams. Moreover, the scope of one particular set of security protection is valid 
on a single zone only. So a single SA is defined for each zone of an IP datagram. Finally all these 
individual zonal SA’s are combined to represent the security relationship of the entire IP datagram. The 
intermediate nodes can have the cryptographic information of the relevant type I zones. The 
cryptographic information related to the type II zone is, however, hidden from any intermediate node. The 
key sharing protocol is responsible for selectively sharing this zone information with the intermediate 
nodes. 
 The DML-IPSec protocol has two basic components. The first one is for processing of datagrams 
at the endpoints as well as intermediate nodes. The second component is the key sharing protocol. The 
endpoints of a DML-IPSec communication involves two types of processing. The first one, called 
Outbound processing, is responsible for generating a DML-IPSec datagram from an IP datagram. It first 
derives the zone boundaries using the zone map and individual header field lengths. After this 
partitioning of IP datagram, zone wise encryption is applied (in case of ESP). Finally zone specific 
authentication trailers are calculated and appended after each zone. The other one, Inbound processing, is 
responsible for generating the original IP datagram from a DML-IPSec datagram. The first step in the 
inbound processing, the derivation of zone boundary, is significantly different from that of outbound 
processing as the length fields of zones remain encrypted. After receiving a DML-IPSec datagram, the 
receiver starts decrypting type I zones till it decrypts the header length field of the header/s. This is 
followed by zone-wise authentication verification and zone-wise decryption. The intermediate nodes 
processes an incoming DML-IPSec datagram depending on the presence of the security parameters for 
that particular DML-IPSec communication. In the absence of the security parameters, the key sharing 
protocol gets executed; otherwise, all the incoming DML-IPSec datagrams get partially decrypted 
according to the security association and zone mapping at the inbound processing module. After the 
inbound processing, the partially decrypted IP datagram traverses through the networking stack of the 
intermediate node . Before the IP datagram leaves the intermediate node, it is processed by the outbound 
module to reconstruct the DML-IPSec datagram.  
The key sharing protocol for sharing zone related cryptographic information among the 
intermediate nodes  is the other important component of the DML-IPSec protocol. This component is 
responsible for dynamically enabling intermediate nodes to access zonal information as required for 
performing specific services relating to quality or security. Whenever a DML-IPSec datagram traverses 
through an intermediate node, that requires access to some of the type I zones, the inbound security 
database is searched for cryptographic parameters. If no entry is present in the database, the key sharing 
protocol is invoked. The very first step in this protocol is a header inaccessible message from the 
intermediate node to the source of the DML-IPSec datagram. The intermediate node also mentions the 
protocol headers that it requires to access in the body portion of this message. This first phase of the 
protocol, called the Zone reorganization phase, is responsible for deciding the zone mapping to provide 
access to intermediate nodes. If the current zone map can not serve the header request, the DML-IPSec 
endpoint reorganizes the existing zone map in this phase. The next phase of the protocol, called the 
Authentication Phase is responsible for verifying the identity of the intermediate node to the source of 
DML-IPSec session. Upon successful authentication, the third phase, called the Shared secret 
establishment phase commences. This phase is responsible for the establishment of a temporary shared 
secret between the source and intermediate nodes. This shared secret is to be used as key for encrypting 
the actual message transfer of the DML-IPSec security parameters at the next phase of the protocol. The 
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final phase of the protocol, called the Security parameter sharing phase, is solely responsible for actual 
transfer of the security parameters from the source to the intermediate nodes. This phase is also 
responsible for updation of security and policy databases of the intermediate nodes. The successful 
execution of the four phases of the key sharing protocol enables the DML-IPSec protocol to dynamically 
modify the zone map for providing access to some header portions for intermediate nodes and also to 
share the necessary cryptographic parameters required for accessing relevant type I zones without 
disturbing an existing DML-IPSec communication. 
 We have implemented the DML-IPSec for ESP protocol according to the definition of zones 
along with the key sharing algorithm. RHEL version 4 and Linux kernel version 2.6.23.14 was used for 
the implementation. We implemented the multi-layer IPSec functionalities inside the native Linux 
implementation of IPSec protocol. The SA structure was updated to hold necessary SA information for 
multiple zones instead of single SA of the normal IPSec. The zone mapping for different zones was 
implemented along with the kernel implementation of SA. The inbound and outbound processing 
modules of the IPSec endpoints were re-implemented to incorporate multi-layer IPSec capability. We also 
implemented necessary modules for providing partial IPSec processing  capabilities at the intermediate 
nodes. The key sharing protocol consists of some user space utilities and corresponding kernel space 
components. We use ICMP protocol for the communications required for the execution of the protocol. 
At the kernel level, pseudo character device driver was implemented to update the kernel space data 
structures and necessary modifications were made to relevant kernel space functions. 
 User space utilities and corresponding kernel space interface were provided for updating the 
security databases. As DML-IPSec ESP uses same Security Policy mechanism as IPSec ESP, existing 
utilities (viz. setkey) are used for the updation of security policy. However, the configuration of the SA is 
significantly different as it depends on the DML-IPSec zones. The DML-IPSec ESP implementation uses 
the existing utilities (setkey and racoon) for configuration of the sole type II zone. The type I zones are 
configured  using the DML-IPSec application. The key sharing protocol also uses this application to 
reorganize the zone mapping and zone-wise cryptographic parameters. The above feature enables one to 





For experimental validation of DML-IPSec, we used the testbed as shown in the above figure. An 
ESP tunnel is configured between the two gateways GW1 and GW2. IN acts as an intermediate node and 
is installed with several intermediate applications. Clients C11 and C21 are connected to GW1 and GW2 
respectively. We carried out detailed experiments for validating our solution w.r.t  firewalling service. We 
used stateful packet filtering using iptables along with string match extension at IN. First, we configured 
the firewall to allow only FTP communication (using port information of TCP header and IP addresses of 
Inner IP header ) between C11 and C21. In the second experiment, we configured the firewall to allow 
only Web connection between C11 and C21 using the Web address of C11 (using HTTP header, port 
information of TCP header and IP addresses of Inner IP header ). 
 In both experiments, we initiated the FTP and WEB sessions before the execution of the key 
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sharing protocol. The session could not be established as the access to upper layer headers was denied. 
After the execution of the key sharing protocol, the sessions could be established, showing the availability 
of protocol headers to the iptables firewall at IN following the successful key sharing. 
 We use record route option of ping program to validate the claim of handling datagrams with 
variable header lengths. This option of ping program records the IP addresses of all the nodes traversed 
during a round trip path in the IP OPTION field. As we used ESP in tunnel mode between GW1 and 
GW2, the IP addresses would be recorded inside the encrypted Inner IP header. We executed ping 
between C11 and C21 and observed the record route output. Before the execution of the key sharing 
protocol, the IP addresses of IN were absent in the record route output. After the successful execution of 
key sharing protocol, the IP addresses for IN were present at the record route output.  
 The DML-IPSec protocol introduces some processing overhead and also increases the datagram 
size as compared to IPSec and ML-IPSec. It increases the datagram size compared to the standard IPSec. 
However, this increase in IP datagram size is present in the case of ML-IPSec as well. The increase in IP 
datagram length depends on the number of zones. As the number of zone increases this overhead also 
increases.  
 We obtain experimental results about the processing delay introduced by DML-IPSec processing. 
For this purpose, we executed ping program from C11 to C21 in the test bed setup for the following 
cases: 1.ML-IPSec with one type I and one type II zone and 2. DML-IPSec with one type I and one type 
II zone. We observe around 10% increase in RTT in DML-IPSec with two dynamic zones over that of 
ML-IPSec with two static zones. This overhead is due to on-the-fly derivation of the zone length and 
related processing. The above experiment analyzes the processing delay at the endpoints without 
intermediate processing. We also analyzed the effect of intermediate processing due to dynamic zones of 
DML-IPSec. We used iptables firewall in the above mentioned experiment. The RTT value for DML-
IPSec with dynamic zones increases by less than 10% over that of ML-IPSec with static zones. 
 To summarize our work, we have proposed an extension to the multilayer IPSec protocol, called 
Dynamic Multilayer IPSec (DML-IPSec). It is capable of dynamic modification of zones and sharing of 
cryptographic parameters between endpoints and intermediate nodes using a key sharing protocol. The 
DML-IPSec also accommodates datagrams with variable header lengths. The above mentioned features 
enable any intermediate node to dynamically  access required header portions of any DML-IPSec 
protected datagrams. Consequently they make the DML-IPSec suited for providing IPSec over mobile 
and distributed networks. We also provide complete implementation of ESP protocol and provide 
experimental validation of our work. We find that our work provides the dynamic support for QoS and 
security services without any significant extra overhead compared to that of ML-IPSec. 
The thesis begins with an introduction to communication security requirements in TCP/IP 
networks. Chapter 2 provides an overview of communication security protocols at different layers. It also 
describes the details of IPSec protocol suite. Chapter 3 provides a study on the interoperability issues 
between IPSec and intermediate devices and discusses about different solutions. Our proposed extension 
to the ML-IPSec protocol, called Dynamic ML-IPSec(DML-IPSec) is presented in Chapter 4. The design 
and implementation details of DML-IPSec in Linux environment is presented in Chapter 5. It also 
provides experimental validation of the protocol. In Chapter 6, we summarize the research work, 
highlight the contributions of the work and discuss the directions for further research. 
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